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THE PROBLEM
The Digital Humanities, and especially the literary side of the Digital Humanities, i.e., Digital
Literary Studies, propose systematic and technologically equipped methodologies in activities
where, for centuries, intuition and intelligent handling had played a predominant role. The recent
“big data” turn in the natural and social sciences has been particularly revealing of how these
new approaches can be applied to traditional scholarly disciplines, such as literary studies. In so
doing, big data can renew, with the use of computers, the Humanities, i.e., the disciplines rationally
studying humanworks and cultural production. Digital Literary Studies are emblematic of these new
approaches, certainly because they constitute the oldest subfield of the Digital Humanities, as some
early projects like the Trésor de la Langue Française attest but also because they are the domain in
which the intellectual stakes of mass digitization has already been extensively used and debated as
demonstrated by Franco Moretti’s Graphs, Maps, Trees (Moretti, 2005), for instance.
Some view this evolution enthusiastically as a shift toward the “hard” sciences. This is the case
of Matthew Jockers who affirms in the chapter entitled “Revolution” of his book Macroanalysis
(Jockers, 2013) that: “Now, slowly and surely, the same elements that have had such an impact on
the sciences are revolutionizing the way that research in the humanities get done” (p. 10). Further
on, he declares that literary methodology is “in essence no different from the scientific one” (p. 13).
Others assert that some questions cannot be dealt with using the samemethods in the humanities
and the natural sciences, like physics or biology. That is the case of Stephen Ramsay, who, in Reading
Machines (Ramsay, 2011), assures us that, even if some problems in the Humanities, like authorship
identification, can clearly find comfort with themethods developed by the natural sciences, for most
literary critical endeavors, such as characterizing the subjectivity of Virginia Wolf in her novel The
Waves, for instance, it is not possible to clearly identify a set of “falsifiable” facts.
Between these two extremes, many scholars provide convincing illustrations of what digitization
allows and then discuss the nature and current evolution of the Humanities in general, and literary
studies in particular. TheCompanion toDigital Humanities (Schreibman et al., 2004), theCompanion
to Digital Literary Studies (Siemens and Schreibman, 2008), and more recently an excellent online
MLACommons anthology dedicated to Literary Studies in the Digital Age (Price and Siemens, 2013)
all provide various and enriching views on these topics.
We attempt here to conciliate the two above-mentioned and apparently antagonistic views with
the help of a philosophical approach. More precisely, our Grand Challenge is in the service of
establishing solid epistemological foundations for the Digital Humanities, which is necessitated by
the increasingly important role attributed to digital tools in humanistic research. We also claim
that employing a conceptual apparatus originally built by German neo-Kantian philosophers at the
beginning of the twentieth century, in particular by Heinrich Rickert and Ernst Cassirer, seems
particularly relevant today with the emergence of “big data,” primarily because the logical nature of
the possible inferences drawn from this sort of data needs to be clarified.
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The following essay is divided into four parts. The first recalls
the distinction between the “sciences of nature” and the “sciences
of culture,” which is at the heart of the Rickert and Cassirer
conceptual apparatus. The second analyzes the status of theDigital
Humanities with respect to this distinction. The next part shows
that the use of big data does not necessarily restrict one to making
purely inductive inferences, in the logical sense, from the data.
It also explains why the logic of the Digital Humanities is closer
to the logic of the traditional Humanities, even if, by making
use of large digital datasets, they at first sight seem incompatible.
Lastly, the final part concludes on the role of theory in Digital
Humanities and gives some examples of the new and exiting areas
of investigation that Digital Literary Studies opens.
THE LOGIC OF THE HUMANITIES
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a German neo-Kantian
philosopher, Heinrich Rickert – who influenced many important
intellectuals, among them the sociologist Max Weber and the
young Martin Heidegger – attempted to base the Humanities on
a rigorous foundation. More precisely, he wanted to scientifically
characterize culture understood as the result of goal-oriented
activities. The notion of the “Sciences of Culture” (Kulturwis-
senschaften1 in German, which designates “Humanities” in Amer-
ican English) (Rickert, 1921) was introduced to epistemologically
ground theHumanities as empirical sciences that interpret human
achievements and activities as the results of mental processes.
Rickert clearly distinguishes the scientific characterization of the
mind enacted by the Humanities from that of the psychological
sciences, which deal with mental phenomena using the methods
of the physical sciences. He affirms that spiritual phenomena have
a specificity that cannot be reduced to their physicality alone, even
if they can be submitted to a rational and empirical inquiry.
According to him, and to his student Ernst Cassirer (Cassirer,
1923, 1942), the underlying logic of the “sciences of culture”
totally differs from the logic of what they call the “sciences of
nature” (Naturwissenschaft), i.e., the natural sciences.2
Briefly speaking, Rickert and Cassirer first differentiate the
theoretical sciences like mathematics, which deal with abstract
and perfect entities, such as numbers, figures, or functions, from
the empirical sciences that are confronted with thematerial reality
of the world. Then, among the empirical sciences, they further
differentiate the “sciences of nature,” which deal with physical per-
ceptions, and the “sciences of culture” that givemeaning to human
works. According to them, the “sciences of nature” proceed by
generalizing cases: they extract general properties of objects and
they determine laws, i.e., constant relations between observations.
As a consequence, the logic of the “sciences of nature” is mainly
inductive, in the logical sense of the word, i.e., this logic goes
from the observation of many particular cases to the construction
of general laws that cover and summarize the observations, even
1For instance, the German title of Cassirer’s book Zur Logik der Kulturwis-
senschaften. has been translated in English “The Logic of the Humanities” (Cassirer,
1942).
2For the sake of clarity, we use here the term “sciences of nature” to refer to the
concept of naturwissenschaft, as used by Rickert and Cassirer in their works, even if
it looks similar to the common notion of natural sciences.
if the practical modalities of reasoning for researchers may be
deductive or abductive. The important point is that the particular
cases have to be forgotten; they have to be abstracted and analyzed
in general terms as composed of well-defined objects that make
no reference to the context of the situation. The validity of this
scientific activity relies on the constancy and the generality of the
extracted laws.
By contrast, the “sciences of culture” do not proceed by gen-
eralizing multiple cases. They do not extract laws, i.e., relations
between observations; they do not even work with physical per-
ceptions, but with meaningful objects that have to be understood.
In brief, their main function is to give sense to the works of
humans, i.e., our shared cultural record. Their means of investiga-
tion is to understand particulars, and their generalmethodology is
to observe individual instances and give meaning to them. How-
ever, they often have to choose, among the particulars, instances
that are paradigmatic, i.e., that can teach general lessons that may
be reused in other circumstances. In other words, the “sciences
of culture” are not properly interested in the singularity of cases,
which should be ignored, but in the overall understandability of
the individual instances under study. Their methods help to give
meaning to observations of complex individual cases.
ARE DIGITAL HUMANITIES “SCIENCES OF
NATURE” OR “SCIENCES OF CULTURE”?
The main question here concerns the epistemological status of
the Digital Humanities. On the one hand, their objects of study,
i.e., human works and cultural records, bring them close to the
“sciences of culture”; on the other hand, their method of inves-
tigation, and especially the use of computers and huge datasets,
seems to bring them close to the “sciences of nature.” Therefore,
at first sight, Digital Humanities in general and Digital Literary
Studies in particular, belong to both the “sciences of nature” and
the “sciences of culture.” However, this dual membership does
not answer the initial question about the specificity of the Digital
Humanities and their status compared to that of the “sciences of
the nature.” Clearly, we must pursue our investigation further. To
do this, let us consider the three following points:
First, Digital Humanities and Digital Literary Studies are
empirical sciences, as are the traditional Humanities, since they
are based on facts. Even if, as Ramsay claims (Ramsay, 2011), it
is difficult to objectively characterize the subjectivity of an author
such as Virginia Wolf, it is absolutely necessary to give facts that
support any hypothesis.
Second, as Ramsay also claims (Ramsay, 2011), humorously
quoting Jarry’s Dr. Faustroll (Jarry, 1911), Digital Literary Studies
do not function as purely inductive sciences: even if they are based
on facts and even though some questions, like the authorship
identification problem, look similar in their formulation to inves-
tigations in the “sciences of the nature,” nobody really aims in
this context to establish general laws. As part of the Humanities,
Digital Literary Studies examines the human record and considers
particulars – e.g., a novel, the work of an author, a generation of
writers, a genre, a culture, etc. – in order to understand theseworks
as goal-oriented activities and to characterize their specificity. But,
unlike the traditional Humanities, Digital Literary Studies also
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makes use of massive datasets that are automatically processed.
In so doing, they propose new digital hermeneutic operators that
give meaning to these human records, without necessarily aiming
to delineate – and still less to discover – general laws.
Finally, the modality of reasoning in the Humanities is essen-
tially abductive, in the sense that Charles Pierce gives to this
word, which means that humanists are looking for provisional
explanations, i.e., for facts that enforce an explanatory hypothesis
within a theoretical framework. For instance, in literary criticism,
intertextuality (Bloom, 1973; Compagnon, 1979; Genette, 1982),
interdiscursivity (Adam, 2006), or textual genetics (Grésillon,
1994; Hay, 2002) are theoretical frameworks to which scholars
refer when they search for explanations that make literary works
more understandable. As mentioned in Murray-Jones (2011), the
use of computers in the Humanities does not necessarily lead
one to abandon theory. On the contrary, programs need to refer
to well-defined theoretical frameworks on which they can bring
pieces of material evidence to bear. This does not mean that each
program need be a theory, or that each individually encodes a
theory, but rather, a program, e.g., a visualization tool, that has not
made an explicit reference to the theoretical framework on which
it is built is useless and has no real scientific value whatever the
facts that it seems to generate.
In summary, point one does not provide any clear evidence in
favor of the Digital Humanities belonging either to the “sciences
of nature” or to the “sciences of culture”; point two seems, at first
sight, to turn the scales toward the “sciences of nature”; while
point three seems to favor the “sciences of culture.” Point two
is of key importance here, because it is through the use of huge
datasets that theDigital Humanities are clearly distinguished from
the traditional Humanities. Does this, however, as Moretti (2005)
and Jockers (2013) suggest, necessarily lead to a change of logic
in the “sciences of the culture,” which become inductive in the
same manner as the “sciences of the nature”? We will investigate
this question further in the next section by detailing the nature of
data-based reasoning.
THE LOGIC OF BIG DATA
Taken literally, the locution “big data” refers to the size of data.
But, what does “big” mean for the Digital Humanities? A million,
a billion, and a trillion bytes are small compared to the Terabytes
and Petabytes that are usually considered as the standard for “big
data.” In the case of Digital Literary Studies, the total number of
texts that can be characterized as literary works, including novels,
poetry, and theater, does not exceed a few million books, which
has been seen characterized as a delimiting horizon by Gregory
Crane in his famous paper, “What do you do with a million
books?” (Crane, 2006). If we consider an average upper size of
1 million characters per book, the overall digital library corre-
sponds at most to a few Terabytes, which is quite small compared
to the current magnitude of scientific big data. Nevertheless, the
Digital Literary Studies need not restrict itself to investigations of
digitized literary texts. In a recent paper, Kaplan (2015) clearly
expresses three levels of big data for the Digital Humanities:
 the level of human records, which corresponds in our case to
literary works.
 the level of social interactions, which, in the case of literary
studies, could include scientific theories that influenced nov-
elists, newspapers to which authors contributed or that related
current world events, and many others. This level corresponds
to the intellectual landscape at time of writing, and while the
idea of digitizing the integrality of the intellectual context for
any given author may seem unrealistic; furthermore, this is
perhaps also a case of confusing the map and the territory.
 the third level gathers material exchanges with technical
devices, such as e-books, which gives an idea of the way people
are reading, orwith computers, whichwill allowus to keep track
of differentwriters’ drafts or search queries of authors or readers
on the web. In the future, this will certainly be a key source of
information that will allow us to evaluate the ways in which
works are produced and received.
However, even if “big data” are often characterized by the
famous “3Vs” acronym – Volume, Variety, and Velocity – neither
the volume of the datasets, nor their variability and “velocity,” i.e.,
their constant evolution, can fully encapsulate the logic of “big
data.” As mentioned in many publications (Aiden and Michel,
2013; Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier, 2013), one of the key char-
acteristics of big data is the absence of sampling. The totality
of data is used during the exploitation, without restriction to a
random selection, like in a survey or a poll, as was the case with
classical statistical studies in the past. In the case of literature,
almost all the published literary texts, scholarly books, and news-
papers will be digitized in the coming years. This means that
it will not only be possible to detect specificities of an author
that distinguish him/her from others or that characterize his/her
work or the generation of writers to which he/she belongs, etc.,
but it will also be possible to identify citations, influences, pla-
giarism, pastiches, or reuses on a truly massive scale as most
of the possible sources of inspiration, i.e., most of the writings
to which the authors could have had access, will be available in
digital form.
Besides the absence of sampling, we should also note that the
algorithmic exploitation of big data does not extract solely causal
relations, but rather empirically observed correlations, among
which only some may correspond to actual causal relationships.
Therefore, contrary to intuition, the inferences drawn from big
data are not necessarily inductive: either the reasoning starts with-
out any theory and generates correlations that need to be proved to
constitute a true body of knowledge, in which case it corresponds
to actual inductive inferences, or it starts from a theory that is used
to find possible explanations of the data, which corresponds to
abductive inferences.
THE LOGIC OF DIGITAL
LITERARY STUDIES
It follows from what we have said that the logic of the Digital
Humanities equipped with big data techniques is definitely a
continuation of the logic of the Humanities, i.e., it may be either
inductive or abductive, even when using very large datasets. More
precisely, even if inductive inferences play a role in the digi-
tal humanists’ investigations, their main modalities of reasoning
are essentially abductive, which means that digital humanists as
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humanists are looking for explanations, i.e., they are seeking facts
that strengthen new hypotheses within a theoretical framework.
This point echoes similar debates that shook the Digital
Humanities community (Fitzpatrick, 2011; Gold, 2012; Presner
and Schnapp, 2013) a few years ago, underscoring the antagonism
between those who envisage the Digital Humanities as a new
theoretical approach to the Humanities, which would constitute
a paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense, and those who think
that it is now time to focus on methods and, more precisely,
on tangible implementations of software that procure empirical
evidence (Berry, 2011; Cecire, 2011). According to this latter
view, it would mean that the Digital Humanities are moving us
toward a “post-theoretical age” in which interpretation becomes
less important than the making of tools, archives or other digital
methods. As Porsdam (2011) claims, this antagonism conceals a
deeper opposition between classical humanist culture, for which
rational thinking is a discursive activity, and techno-scientific
culture, which asserts that the reaching of certainty today requires
formalization.
Our claim here is that, despite these debates within the larger
Digital Humanities community, for Digital Literary Studies, there
is no real antagonism between the logic of the “sciences of culture,”
as described by Rickert and Cassirer, and the making of tools
that help to interpret huge databases with respect to existing
theories. In other words, computer-aidedmethods can be seen as a
continuation of traditional humanistic approaches. As such, they
can afford many opportunities to renew humanistic methods and
to make them more accurate, by helping to empirically confront
working hypotheses with datasets that now approach the entirety
of our printed record, taking into consideration not only literary
works themselves but also the intellectual landscapes surrounding
the authors of these works.
To conclude, the Grand Challenge that we support in this paper
is to build tools that are able to analyze literary works through the
prism of such or such theory, and that can furthermore provide
evidence of the fecundity of the theory under consideration. These
tools automate hermeneutic operators, among which some are
traditional and others new, and which are made possible by the
mass digitization of our shared cultural record. We have followed
this approach in the development of MEDITE (Ganascia et al.,
2004), a text aligner for textual genetics and the comparative
publishing of textual variants, and also with PHŒBUS (Ganascia
et al., 2014), a program that detects textual reuses and other forms
of intertextuality. This is also what we are currently doing in terms
of theories of “interdiscursivity,” which we explore by detecting
semantic patterns in passages of texts, both for stylistic analysis
(Boukhaled and Ganascia, 2015; Frontini et al., 2015), by extract-
ing syntactic patterns, and for semantic analysis (Mpouli and
Ganascia, 2015), by extracting similes using comparativemarkers.
Our hope is that these approaches will allow us, in the near future,
to generate new theories of interpretation inspired by the making
and the use of programs operating on “big data,” and to open new
areas of intellectual investigation in the field of Digital Literary
Studies.
In addition to this conclusion and its possible contributions
to Digital Literary Studies, our Grand Challenge also seeks to
contributemore generally in laying of the epistemological ground-
work for the Digital Humanities. To do this, we are drawing not
only on technology and on the epistemology of technology, but
also on a classical philosophical tradition that likewise attempted,
a century ago, to lay the epistemological groundwork for the
Humanities. Today, we believe that such an epistemological reflec-
tion is both necessary and urgent due to the increasing impact of
digitization on all humanistic endeavors.
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